Fuzzy intuitionistic quantum logics (called also Brouwer-Zadeh logics) represent to non standard version of quantum logic where the connective not is split into two different negation: a fuzzy-like negation that gives rise to a paraconsistent behavior and an intuitionistic-like negation. A completeness theorem for a particular form of Brouwer-Zadeh logic (BZL 3) is proved. A phisical interpretation of these logics can be constructed in the framework of the unsharp approach to quantum theory.

Cet article étudie le rapport entre pouvoir spirituel et pouvoir temporel dans la pensée de l’augustinien Jacques de Viterbe († 1307/8), à la lumière de l’édition de deux sermones de mortuis inédits, écrits et prononcés entre 1303 et 1305, lorsqu’il était archevêque de Naples. Cette étude vise donc à offrir une interprétation de la pensée politique de Jacques, à travers la lecture diachronique de ses œuvres, à partir de la Disputatio prima de quolibet jusqu’à ses derniers écrits, afin de suivre (...) l’évolution de sa théorie politique, de son ouverture progressive à la perspective de Thomas d’Aquin et de la réception du principe aristotélicien de la naturalitas de la société humaine. (shrink)

On the basis of Mackey's axiomatic approach to quantum physics or, equivalently, of a “state-event-probability” (SEVP) structure, using a quite standard “fuzzification” procedure, a set of unsharp events (or “effects”) is constructed and the corresponding “state-effect-probability” (SEFP) structure is introduced. The introduction of some suitable axioms gives rise to a partially ordered structure of quantum Brouwer-Zadeh (BZ) poset; i.e., a poset endowed with two nonusual orthocomplementation mappings, a fuzzy-like orthocomplementation, and an intuitionistic-like orthocomplementation, whose set of sharp elements is an (...) orthomodular complete lattice. As customary, by these orthocomplementations the two modal-like necessity and possibility operators are introduced, and it is shown that Ludwig's and Jauch-Piron's approaches to quantum physics are “interpreted” in complete SEFP. As a marginal result, a standard procedure to construct a lot of unsharp realizations starting from any sharp realization of a fixed observable is given, and the relationship among sharp and corresponding unsharp realizations is studied. (shrink)

This essay examines how Michael Walzer and Dietrich Bonhoeffer understand practical moral dilemmas—what Walzer calls the problem of dirty hands—and how both conceive of the solution to the problem in terms of the concept of judgment. Walzer's judgment is strictly political, and tragic; Bonhoeffer's retains this political account but grounds it theologically, so as to overcome its finally tragic element.

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Of all the works attributed to Ovid but of disputed authenticity, the epistle of Sappho to Phaon is notoriously the one which has most perplexed scholars. Most philologists at the end of the 19th century asserted the Ovidian paternity of the epistle; but in recent years the discussion has flared up once again, especially following an important contribution, tending in the opposite direction, by R. J. Tarrant, and today, above all in Anglo-American studies, the pendulum seems to be swinging more (...) in the direction of inauthenticity, according to the movement typical in debates of this kind. The present article obviously does not intend to discuss the whole question once again nor to reaffirm tout court the attribution to Ovid, but brings to the attention of scholars certain arguments which should not be neglected in the discussion . I do not mean to underestimate the linguistic, stylistic, and metrical anomalies which scholars up to Tarrant and beyond have imputed to the epistula Sapphus, but rather to indicate some characteristics, above all of compositional technique, which have not been considered but which I think have a not insignificant weight in the debate on authenticity. (shrink)

The standard Pawlak approach to rough set theory, as an approximation space consisting of a universe U and an equivalence (indiscernibility) relation R U x U, can be equivalently described by the induced preclusivity ("discernibility") relation U x U \ R, which is irreflexive and symmetric.We generalize the notion of approximation space as a pair consisting of a universe U and a discernibility or preclusivity (irreflexive and symmetric) relation, not necessarily induced from an equivalence relation. In this case the "elementary" (...) sets are not mutually disjoint, but all the theory of generalized rough sets can be developed in analogy with the standard Pawlak approach. On the power set of the universe, the algebraic structure of the quasi fuzzy-intuitionistic "classical" (BZ) lattice is introduced and the sets of all "closed" and of all "open" definable sets with the associated complete (in general nondistributive) ortholattice structures are singled out. (shrink)

Some algebraic structures determined by the class σ(þ) of all effects of a Hilbert space þ and by some subclasses of σ(þ) are investigated, in particular de Morgan-Brouwer-Zadeh posets [it is proved that σ(þ n )(n<∞) has such a structure], Brouwer-Zadeh * posets (a quite trivial example consisting of suitable effects is given), and Brouwer-Zadeh 3 posets which are both de Morgan and *.It is shown that a nontrivial class of effects of a Hilbert space exists which is a BZ (...) 3 poset. An ɛ-preclusivity relation on the set of all vectors of þ is introduced, and it is shown that it satisfies the regularity condition also for ε∃ [1/2, 1]. (shrink)

We discuss the problem of how a (commutative) generalized observable in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space (communtative effect-valued resolution of the identity) can be considered as an unsharp realization of some standard observable (projection-valued resolution of the identity). In particular, we give a concrete procedure for constructing such a standard observable. Some results about the “uniqueness” of the resulting observable are also examined.

The theoretical scheme proposed by Aerts for describing two separated entities as a whole within a question-state structure is considered. The quoted author claims that two relevant axioms characterizing quantum physics cannot hold for a quantum, nonclassical entity consisting of two quantum separate entities. We suggest that Aerts' theory is not adequate, from the empirical point of view, to describe this situation.

This article presents and compares various algebraic structures that arise in axiomatic unsharp quantum physics. We begin by stating some basic principles that such an algebraic structure should encompass. Following G. Mackey and G. Ludwig, we first consider a minimal state-effect-probability (minimal SEFP) structure. In order to include partial operations of sum and difference, an additional axiom is postulated and a SEFP structure is obtained. It is then shown that a SEFP structure is equivalent to an effect algebra with an (...) order determining set of states. We also consider σ-SEFP structures and show that these structures distinguish Hilbert space from incomplete inner product spaces. Various types of sharpness are discussed and under what conditions a Brouwer complementation can be defined to obtain a BZ-poset is investigated. In this case it is shown that every effect has a best lower and upper sharp approximation and that the set of all Brouwer sharp effects form an orthoalgebra. (shrink)

The notion of coexistence between questions is introduced in the framework of Piron's approach to quantum physics, using Aerts' notion of performable-together questions. Relationships between coexistence of questions and Piron's compatibility of propositions are investigated. In particular, properties generated by coexistent and primitive questions are compatible.

The history of Fuzziness in Italy is varied and scattered among a num- ber of research groups. As a matter of fact, “fuzziness” spread in Italy through a sort of spontaneous diffusion, and, also subsequently, no one felt the need to cre- ate some “national” common structure like an Association or similar things. Since a cohesive retelling would be next to impossible, a few members of the Italian fuzzy community have been asked to recount their experience and express their hopes (...) for the future. (shrink)

The mathematical description of the three distinct fundamental notions of “individual sample” of “preparing procedure,” and of “Piron's state” of a physical entity are precisely introduced in the framework of the Piron's “preparation-question structure” (without specific axioms C, P, A) based on Ludwig's “selection structure.” We compare our realization of the above notions with a similar use of the standard terminology of the “Geneva School” adopted by Pykacz and Santos in a recent paper.

In light of the allegations of sexual misconduct and harassment made against Harvey Weinstein and other powerful men in recent months, this paper will examine how men might take on responsibility for themselves and a culture that enables these patterns of abuse. It will draw primarily on the work of Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, and Emmanuel Levinas to develop a model of responsibility that has three primary stages: taking ownership of past actions, critiquing gendered power relations, and learning how to (...) foster relationships that are “intersubjective.”. (shrink)

There is an inherent phenomenological tendency in British moral theory, especially from John Locke onward. The purpose of his Essay was, he said, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with. This is language that might serve well in a general description of the work of Husserl and other phenomenologists.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’AutrécourtDallas G. Denery IIChristophe Grellard. Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’Autrécourt. Paris: J. Vrin, 2005. Pp. 313. Paper, €38,00.Nicholas of Autrecourt has often seemed to be one of those philosophers doomed to be best known for everything but their own ideas. Famously, if inaccurately, dubbed "the Medieval Hume" by one of his first (...) modern critics, the threat or fear of skepticism has in one way or another shaped most subsequent studies of Nicholas's work. While understandable, this really is unfortunate. Nicholas himself clearly states that his philosophical goal was to avoid the skeptical consequences that he believed were latent in the writings of his scholastic peers. In this excellent new work, the first monograph-length study devoted to Nicholas's thought in nearly 60 years, Christophe Grellard goes a long way towards recovering Nicholas's very real contributions to fourteenth-century intellectual life.Any attempt to interpret Nicholas's thought runs up against one significant problem—few of his works survive. All that remains are a fascinating and lengthy (not to mention, confusing and unfinished) work of natural philosophy, Exigit ordo, and several letters touching on issues in epistemology, cognition, and logic. As a result, even situating Nicholas's thought within the proper intellectual currents of the first decades of the fourteenth century has proven difficult. Whose work influenced him? Who were the objects of his criticism? What were his motives? Until recently, most scholars have attempted to trace the influence of William Ockham on Nicholas's thought. Drawing from recent work on the University of Paris during the fourteenth century, Grellard not only downplays Ockham's influence on Nicholas, but also Nicholas's membership in the faculty of theology. Rather, he stresses Nicholas's ongoing involvement in the arts faculty, where he continued to teach even as he studied for his degree in theology. This has two significant consequences. First, it allows Grellard to treat all of Nicholas's writings as contributions to the practice of natural philosophy. Indeed, in his compelling first chapter, Grellard contends that the initial sections of the Exigit, in which Nicholas famously condemns scholastic Aristotelianism as nothing more than an institutionalized pedagogy of error and untruth, must be read as a plea for a distinction between philosophy and theology, between speculation and faith. Even if Nicholas was not alone at the time in pushing for these distinctions (Ockham and John Buridan had argued along similar lines), Grellard demonstrates that Nicholas's approach was certainly the more radical and extreme. Second, the shift in focus from theology to arts brings with it a shift in Nicholas's most important interlocutors. To begin, Aristotle and Averroes become constant background forces in Nicholas's thought. Moreover, as the final section of Grellard's work makes clear, many of Nicholas's ideas are most usefully understood in light of writings of two other arts masters, John Buridan and Nicole Oresme, rather than in the context of debates among his contemporaries in the theology faculty. [End Page 119]These initial interpretive decisions shape the overall structure of Grellard's book, which moves, in three parts, from a deft analysis of Nicholas's theory of evidence and probability to his account of the objects of cognition and, finally, to a comparison of Nicholas's and Buridan's epistemological theories. Unlike so many prior studies that begin with Nicholas's famous critique of a fellow theologian's cognitive theories, thereby framing Nicholas's project in terms of theological debates concerning the intuitive cognition of non-existents and God's ability to cause false visions, Grellard begins with Nicholas's positive theory of knowledge. This effectively sidesteps the entire question of Nicholas's skepticism, a question Nicholas himself explicitly tried to avoid. Nicholas comes across as a philosopher keenly aware of the limits of human cognition, yet eager to develop a viable and wholly rational epistemology within those limits. Those limits, Grellard makes clear, have everything to do with appearances, with what we can rationally and legitimately infer about the world based upon what we see... (shrink)

Although treating the elderly occasion the same kinds of ethical issues as treating other patients, specific problems do arise when making decisions for persons, once competent, who no longer can express their values. I examine the problem of decisional incapacity and offer a critique of the principles, such as substituted judgment, and the instruments, such as advance directives, living wills, other instructional directives, as well as surrogate decision-makers.

This essay explores the preferences, anticipations and expectations of the elderly regarding the role of family members in making health care decisions for them should they become decisionally incapacitated. Findings are presented from a series of in-depth interviews of men and women aged 67–91 years. Following a discussion of the uncertain legal status of familial surrogate decision-making, we argue that the family unit's autonomy is sufficient to justify the elderly's preferred reliance on their own family. Further, we suggest that social (...) and legal policy changes should facilitate, rather than impede, familial decision-making. (shrink)

Based on an unfinished manuscript by the late philosopher Dallas Willard, this book makes the case that the 20th century saw a massive shift in Western beliefs and attitudes concerning the possibility of moral knowledge, such that knowledge of the moral life and of its conduct is no longer routinely available from the social institutions long thought to be responsible for it. In this sense, moral knowledge--as a publicly available resource for living--has disappeared. Via a detailed survey of main developments (...) in ethical theory from the late 19th through the late 20th centuries, Willard explains philosophy's role in this shift. In pointing out the shortcomings of these developments, he shows that the shift was not the result of rational argument or discovery, but largely of arational social forces--in other words, there was no good reason for moral knowledge to have disappeared. The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge is a unique contribution to the literature on the history of ethics and social morality. Its review of historical work on moral knowledge covers a wide range of thinkers including T.H Green, G.E Moore, Charles L. Stevenson, John Rawls, and Alasdair MacIntyre. But, most importantly, it concludes with a novel proposal for how we might reclaim moral knowledge that is inspired by the phenomenological approach of Knud Logstrup and Emmanuel Levinas. Edited and eventually completed by three of Willard's former graduate students, this book marks the culmination of Willard's project to find a secure basis in knowledge for the moral life. (shrink)